| The Meaning of the Second World War |
Dear Comrades, I was left somewhat puzzled by Gemma Forest's review of Ernest Mandel's book The Meaning of the Second World War in issue No 4. The tone of the review was sharp, one might even say hostile, yet on the substantive issues of the book very lit¬tle seemed to be said. From what can be gleaned from the review it seems that Forest disagrees with Mandel on two points: (a) Mandel's interpretation of the nature of Stalinist Russia, and (b) the character of the post 1945 period, ie the dimension of the defeat of the working class in that period. Admittedly, both topics are contingent to the subject of Mandel's book but they are not central to the theme of the work. Mandel made the point that `...the meaning of the Second World War, like that of its predecessor, can be grasped only in the context of the imperialist drive for world domination...' (p 17), and that unless this central issue is understood much of what happened seems to be meaningless. I most certainly agree with Forest that it is somewhat spurious to suggest that the military victories of Stalinist Russia in World War Two were due to the legacy of the October 1917 revolution. This form of historiography is highly selective, since it attributes all that is `good' to nationalised property plus `planning' and all that is `bad' to Stalinist bureaucratic in¬competence. Such a method fails to con¬ceive of the society in question as a dialec¬tical unity. This failure by Mandel stems from his clinging to the idea that the Soviet Union is a degenerated workers' state. Thus far I would go along with Forest, but I cannot agree that the book is an `apology for Stalinism'. To categorise Mandel's work in such a manner is to misuse language. One can disagree with Mandel, disagree with his characterisation of the Soviet Union, disagree with his estimation of the significance of various events, etc, etc, but it is pushing matters beyond the bounds of credibility when he is labelled as an apologist for Stalinism. The Oxford Dictionary defines an apologist as someone who `defends by argument', and I found nothing in Mandel's book that would fit such a description. Perhaps one could argue that, because Mandel has a particular view of the nature of the Soviet Union, he is not critical enough, or that he fails to understand certain questions. That, however, is quite different from being an apologist. Much of Forest's `review' is taken up with a parade of iniquities perpetrated by the Stalinist regime. Most of them if not all would be known to anyone with some knowledge of the history of the Soviet Union. I doubt if Mandel would doubt the veracity of Forest's case, since he has over the years used many similar in¬stances and arguments in attacking the Stalinist regime. In this case it seems that Forest was kicking an open door. However, Mandel is accused of dishones¬ty, dishonesty by omission; and that seems to be the reason for Forest's tirade. It is implied that Mandel has attempted to suppress the facts that Forest brings for¬ward. Such a case could only be made if she can prove that Mandel has consciously chosen to omit evidence that would run contrary to his own case. To accuse so¬meone of dishonesty one needs chapter and verse evidence, not speculative ac¬cusations. Forest fails to provide such evidence. Forest pours scorn on Mandel (and some unspecified bourgeois critics, but the suggestion here is that Mandel falls in¬to the same category) for his pointing to Stalin's refusal to accept the abundant evidence that Hitler was preparing to at¬tack the Soviet Union in 1941. The ex¬istence of this evidence, and Stalin's refusal to accept it, is now well documented and was first acknowledged in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev in 1956 at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. She is broadly correct in her resume of Stalin's foreign policy from the early 1930s as being an attempt to exploit inter¬imperialist rivalries. But this does not thereby disprove Stalin's myopic conduct regarding Hitler's plans for attack. On the contrary; Stalin's conduct in this respect indicated his own naive self confidence in assuming that he had deflected Hitler with the 1939 Soviet German Pact. I found nothing in Mandel's account which would indicate anything else. Therefore, I am at a loss as to why he is accused of dishones¬ty. Our credulity is stretched when Forest says `Although the Cold War meant a temporary collapse in East West links, the 1941 46 period gave the Soviet Union "superpower" status...' This `temporary collapse' lasted nearly 30 years, which I suppose is temporary on the scales of history, but it seemed a hell of a long time to those who endured it. Forest seems able to paint history with a very wide brush stroke when it suits her. The talk of 'tem¬porary collapse' in this manner enables her to sweep under the carpet 30 years or so of history, and thus it needs no ex¬planation. This brings me to the second point that Forest seems to hold against Mandel, ie the depth of the defeat of the working class inflicted by the Second World War. This is undoubtedly a matter for legitimate debate and has a bearing upon how one interprets the post war development of capitalism and the Soviet Bloc. Few, if any, Marxists or bourgeois pundits foresaw just how capitalism would develop in the post war era. In this respect Mandel erred at the time (with most others) in assuming that any recovery would be short-lived. Since then, however, he seems to have adjusted his views, hard¬ly surprising in view of what actually hap¬pened. The part played in this defeat of the working class and the subsequent long wave of capitalist prosperity by the injection of national chauvinism is something that has probably been played down. However, that is a matter of historical judgement, not of `criminal' intent, or `criminal' activity. The use of such a label in a discussion between socialists is completely out of place. Even Forest has to admit that the `criminal' Mandel played a principle and heroic' role during the Second World War. I see no evidence that Mandel has substantially changed today from that same person pre 1945. This is, of course, not to say that Mandel and the work under consideration is above criticism. My own view is that the book is more in the nature of an extended essay rather than a full treatment of the subject, and this is its main defect. The very brevity of the work brevity in rela¬tion to the topic means that Mandel on¬ly deals in summary fashion with many of the crucial events. The defect of this method is highlighted by the manner in which Forest is able to accuse Mandel of omissions and make much more of them than is justified by what is actually in the book. However, even allowing for the defects in the book, I still remain puzzled as to what exactly Forest is criticising. Does she disagree with the main conclu¬sion that Mandel draws? Personally, I do not dissent from Mandel's main proposi¬tion that the 1939 45 war was fundamen¬tally an inter imperialist conflict for world domination, but also had other dimen¬sions, the nature of which Mandel ex¬plores. Nor, for example, would I disagree with Mandel when he argues that the roots of the Nazi extermination campaign against the Jews were nurtured by the racist and imperialist ideology of capitalist imperialism. That campaign by the Nazis was not some sudden aberration, but the result of a long historical process. But I feel that Mandel fails to understand that the `final solution' represented a qualitative leap, not a mere continuation. Nearly all other previous racist or col¬onialist campaigns of mass murder had some sort of insane logic. The campaign of extinction against the American Red Indians had a very precise purpose, ie the clearing of land for settlement. Many other instances could be given of such methods. But in the case of the Nazi exter¬mination campaign against the Jews there was no such `logic' which might have `justified' it. On the contrary, the whole campaign diverted materials and labour away from the war effort of Germany. In this respect Mandel fails to come to terms with this most gruesome episode. Certain¬ly racism is a part of the armoury of the ruling class even today, but what the Nazi episode indicates is that it can become dysfunctional for that class once it is unleashed in the manner of Hitler. Ideology does indeed become a material force once it grips large sections of the population, but not always in the manner required or hoped for. So, I do not object to criticism of Mandel; rather I question the wisdom of the methods used by Gemma Forest. To say that Mandel is `soft on Stalinism' or is a `criminal' doesn't take us one inch for¬ward. The use of such epithets may relieve the spleen, but it teaches us nothing. This method of `polemic' has been used far too often as a substitute for argument, and it only muddles the issues instead of clarify¬ing them. So far the standard of discus¬sion in Revolutionary History has been on a different level, and I hope the Editors will ensure that this standard is maintain¬ed in the future. I assume that discussions in the pages of the journal are among comrades, whom we may not agree with, but who are prepared to respect different points of view honestly held. The place for factional in fighting is in other jour¬nals, not in these pages. Ken Tarbuck Trotsky and the POUM Dear Comrades, Volume 1, No 2 of Revolutionary History (Summer 1988) published a statement by the international Spartacist tendency in which we commented that the article by Paul Flewers in the same issue on `Stalinism and Spain' treated the POUM with kid gloves. In a letter in the last issue (Spring 1989) Refiner Tosstorff wrote that our statement contained `some really im¬portant errors'. `It is simply not true', he states, `that Trotsky broke with the Iz¬quierda Comunista over the fusion with the Maurinists' in September 1935; Trot¬sky was against it `but accepted it as a ma¬jority decision of the Spanish section'. And while breaking with the POUM over the signing of the `election platform' (of the People's Front) in February 1936, Tosstorff says, Trotsky was willing to col¬laborate with them in August, then broke again `much more "definitively"' in September over the POUM's entrance in¬to the Catalan government. This is much more than a question of dates; what is at issue here is the attitude of Trotsky toward the Popular Front. As we wrote: `Trotskyists are not simply op¬posed to, but rather counterposed to, the Popular Front and every class-¬collaborationist alliance which subor¬dinates the interests of the proletariat to those of the bourgeoisie.' Trotsky made exceptional efforts to win and retain Comintern revolutionary veterans like Henk Sneevliet, Alfred Rosmer and, not least, Andres Nin. But recurring major political differences separated Trotsky from Nin before September 1935. Writing on the murder of Nin by agents of Stalin's GPU, Trotsky noted (8 August 1937) that `as early as the beginning of 1933, differences of opinion on questions of principle led to a complete break between us'. Prefiguring their later betrayal in joining the Popular Front, in April 1933 Nin/Andrade had offered `loyal collaboration' in a Stalinist called `national anti Fascist conference', to in¬clude bourgeois pacifists. Trotsky de¬nounced this as a `mockery of the United Front policy' and declared that 1Vin's campaign against the International Left Opposition `violates the most fundamen¬tal principles of Marxism'. (Nin screamed about interference when Trotsky made available to the membership of the Spanish section extracts from his running polemics in their correspondence). From Nin's `national Trotskyism' to the POUM and the Popular Front was a logical evolu¬tion. For their part, the leaders of the Iz¬quierda Comunista certainly saw the 1935 fusion as their break with the Trotskyist movement. When the International Secretariat called on the Spanish section to follow 'international organisational discipline' and `take your complete in¬dependence' from Maurin and Co, Nin responded in a vituperative letter (21 July 1935) accusing the international organisa¬tion of seeking to demoralise and split the Spanish militants to produce an `insignifi¬cant nucleus which ...would bear the pom¬pous name of "Spanish section of the In¬ternational Communist League",' and peremptorily refused to send the IS infor¬mation it requested, for `lack of time' and because `given your fundamental lack of understanding of Spanish affairs, we don't think it would be useful to you'. In his book Leon Trotski y Espana (1930 1939), former Izquierda Comunista leader Ignacio Iglesias wrote that `the break with Trotsky had freed the Spanish Trotskyists from a kind of corset which required them to maintain an ideological rigidity...' And Nin's biographer, Pelai Pagès, concludes his study El Movimiento Trotskista en Espana (1930 1935) with the remark that `the final difference that set the Izquierda Comunista and Trotsky at odds in 1934 and 1935 was the pretext and definitive justification which the Izquier¬da Comunista used to put an end to its Trotskyism, above all its organisational Trotskyism'. The `corset' of `organisa¬tional Trotskyism' which Nin threw away was international democratic centralism and the Leninist programme. So what was Trotsky's view of the for¬mation of the POUM? Tosstorff cites his comments about reports on the trip to Spain by International Secretariat delegate Jean Rous. In a letter of 16 September 1935 to Rous, Trotsky wrote of the `ostracism' by the leaders of the Spanish section of the international, while noting of the about to be founded POUM: `The new party is proclaimed. Duly noted. To the extent that this can depend on international factors, we must do everything to help this party gain strength and authori¬ty. Which is only possible along the path of consistent and intransigent Marxism. Along this path, I am ready, just as, I'm sure, all the comrades of the IS are, for any collaboration that may be requested of us.' Trotsky's counsel to the IS was to `await patiently the lesson of experience'. This was not long in coming. Pierre Broue notes in his recent biography Trotsky that Rous was `optimistic and foresaw a positive evolution, but in fact the relations were at a dead end between the Spanish leaders on the one hand, Trotsky and the secretariat on the other...' In a footnote in his collection of Trot¬sky's writings (La révolution espagnole 1930 1940) Broue writes that `the only writing of Trotsky on Spain contem¬poraneous with the foundation of the POUM which we have been able to discover' is a letter of 18 October 1935 to Sneevliet. Here Trotsky takes the POUM to task for its claim that the London Bureau was working for `reconstruction of revolutionary unity on a new basis' and insists `in a friendly way' on the need for theoretical and political clarity `in the interests of the future of the new Spanish party'. Not a ringing denunciation but not exactly `acceptance' of the fusion as the `majority decision of the Spanish section' as Tosstorff says. In any case, the `Spanish section' ceased to exist as of the fusion. What is most notable is Trotsky's relative silence on the formation of the POUM. And there is a document which can shed light on that. A resolution of 15 February 1936 of the International Secretariat said that while the fusion was a `de facto split' and `the fatal conse¬quences of a whole long series of dif¬ferences with the ICL(BL)', it had decided to `postpone any organisational measure in the hope of showing through the ex¬perience of acts the true opportunist con¬tent of the POUM'. This was shown by the POUM's joining the left electoral bloc, whereupon the IS `publicly de¬nounced) the attitude of the members of the Izquierda Comunista who covered for this treasonous operation' (reprinted in the collection prefaced by Broue, La révolution' espagnole (1936 39). There is no reason to believe that Trotsky differed on this with the IS, led by Leon Sedov. Certainly, in August 1936 Trotsky did offer a `sincere and lasting rapprochment' with Nin and Andrade. This was at the outset of the Civil War, which represented a qualitative change in the situation, at a time when the POUM was organising workers' militias, and the Trotskyists were dispatching international comrades to fight in Spain. But that soon changed, as Nin entered the Popular Front Catalan government and the Trotskyists were ex¬pelled from the POUM's armed forma¬tions. Likewise, on the projected interna¬tional conference called by the POUM, Trotsky was for waging a struggle against the Popular Front, participating or not participating `according to cir¬cumstances'; but, he warned, par¬ticipating as Vereecken and Sneevliet wished, concilating the POUM leaders, would be `fatal'. And the POUM was in¬vited to send observers to the founding conference of the Fourth International (Rodolphe Prager, ed, Les congres de la IVe Internationale, Volume 1). Concerning Trotsky's remark in Volume 15 of the French edition of his writings, cited by Tosstorff, what be says is: `As to the necessity of unification, our fight with the POUM was not over unification but over the question, will the policy unify the bourgeoisie or the new creative elements from the proletariat?' Pierre Broue claims that `Trotsky hereby gives the lie to the very widespread version that his break with Nin and his comrades was the consequence of the constitution of the POUM with Maurin and his people'. Hardly. The entire context of Trotsky's remark, both before and after his com¬ment on `unification', is about the forma¬tion and unification of soviets (as against Nin's predilection for `unifying' with the official leaders of Spanish labour); not a word about the formation of the POUM. Tosstorff's letter reflects the views of those who disagree with or are uncomfor¬table with Trotsky's repeated, emphatic denunciations of the POUM for capitulating to the Popular Front. Yet this was central to everything Trotsky wrote on Spain from January 1936, when he ex¬coriated the POUM's `betrayal of the pro¬letariat for the sake of an alliance with the bourgeoisie', up to his unfinished 1940 ar¬ticle on 'The Class, the Party and the Leadership'. There was a whole sector of the Trotskyist movement at the time, with Sneevliet and Vereecken in the forefront, who repeatedly opposed Trotsky and the IS on this hard proletarian opposition to class collaboration. By the time the Fourth International was founded in 1938, they had left. Tosstorff likes the article by Keith Hassell, a supporter of the Movement for a Revolutionary Communist Interna¬tional, on `Trotsky and the POUM' (also in Revolutionary History Volume 1, No 2) better than the Spartacist statement. Hassell's article documents well a number of examples of the POUM's opportunism, but there is one betrayal by Nin and An¬drade he doesn't mention: their abandon¬ment of the struggle for the Fourth Inter¬national in favour of vague references about `international revolutionary unity on a new basis'. Yet this was at the centre of Trotsky's critique of the POUM from October 1935 on. Fraternally Jan Norden for the International Secretariat International Communist League (Fourth Internationalist) Dear Comrades, Comrade Ratner's letter on the French Resistance (Revolutionary History Vol 2, No 1) serves, in my view, to perpetuate two serious misconceptions about the role of the Trotskyists during the Second World War, and the political aspirations of the resistance in general. In his letter Comrade Ratner argues that; (a) the Trot¬skyists made 'a huge mistake to refuse to participate in the Resistanre because it was a bourgeois movement', and (b) that even if the Trotskyists had participated in the resistance their political influence would nevertheless have been restricted because the movement was `unfortunately more patriotic than revolutionary'. On both counts Comrade Ratner is incorrect! Firstly, regarding Trotskyist participa¬tion in the resistance, it is true that in the early stages of the war strong doubts were expressed about participating in this movement. It was argued that the resistance was merely an appendage of the Allied imperialists' war machine, and that consequently to support the resistance would be tantamount to supporting one imperialist camp against the other. However, this position was only sustained until 1943. After this date, Trotskyists were in actual fact encouraged to join and participate in the resistance. The evidence in this change in line is to be found in the documents of the Provi¬sional European Secretariat of the Fourth International. In its 'Resolution on the Partisan Movement' of December 1943 (reproduced in Prager's L'Internationale Dans La Guerre, La Breche, 1981), the Secretariat argues that because the resistance had by this time transformed itself from small groups of individual ter¬rorists, into a more or less mass organisa¬tion, it was now necessary for Trotskyists to participate in this movement. The rele¬vant section of this resolution states that: `the Bolshevik Leninists today cannot remain content with denouncing these organisations [the resistance ID] as working in the interests of imperialism. They cannot confine themselves to stressing to the workers the priority of factory work. They must at the same time, penetrate the ranks of the partisans with their own policy in order to organise the latent revolutionary forces in them on a class political and organisational basis.' [Emphasis mine] Further evidence of Trotskyist participa¬tion in the resistance is provided by Andre Calves, who in his book Sans bottes ni medailles (La Breche, 1984), recounts his adventures as a member of the Communist controlled FTP. Indeed, it would seem from his book that Calves was an advocate of entry into the resistance long before the European Secretariat decided on this line of action. Secondly, on the question of the political nature of the resistance, whilst it may be true that many resistants were pure and simple patriots who fought for the re establishment of bourgeois democracy, this is not to say, as Comrade Ratner appears to do, that a powerful revolutionary and Socialist wing did not exist within the movement. On the con¬trary, historians of the resistance have noted that there was in fact a fairly exten¬sive left current within the movement. This current was motivated by a widespread revulsion against the pre-war bourgeois order, which was held responsi¬ble for the horrors of capitulation, col¬laboration and occupation. Against this background, many resistants therefore felt that not only was it necessary to fight the Nazis but at the same time it was equally necessary to launch a simultaneous struggle for a more just and Socialist post war society. Such feelings found a practical expres¬sion in the resistants' opposition to the re¬establishment of the status quo ante¬bellum at the time of the liberation. For example, there was great reluctance within the movement to comply with De Gaulle's directive to incorporate the popular resistance militias into the regular army and police force. Likewise, there were countless examples of local resistance leaders/committees who opposed the im¬position of Gaullist prefects in their par¬ticular localities. The Trotskyists who participated in the resistance orientated themselves towards such developments, and through their propaganda and activities attempted to separate the interests of Socialist resistants from the embrace of bourgeois na¬tionalism. Indeed, it was the French Trot¬skyists who actually encouraged and led the seizure of a number of factories in the Paris area from their bourgeois owners during the liberation period. To conclude with, it is my view that the failure of the French Trotskyists cannot thus be explained, as Comrade Ratner at¬tempts to do, in terms of their refusal to enter the resistance, and nor can it be ex¬plained by the lack of a left wing within the resistance both of these factors were present. The truth of the matter is that the Trotskyists and revolutionary Socialists in general failed to advance their cause because of their numerical weakness and the perfidious r81e of Stalinism. This fact is attested to by the rô1e played by Maurice Thorez, leader of the PCF. On his return from Moscow in 1945, Thorez used his not inconsiderable per¬sonal prestige, and the tremendous prestige and influence of his party to smash and suppress any and all resistance to the re establishment of the bourgeois state. In fact it was Thorez who in 1945 put an end to any illusions that the Com¬munists would seize power when he declared that `there was only one state, one police force and one army' the state, police and army of De Gaulle. Finally, it must also be pointed out that in their efforts to maintain their wartime alliance with Anglo US imperialism„ the Stalinists committed terrible acts of treachery and brutality against Trotskyists and revolutionary Socialists. For example, many Chinese Trotskyists who par¬ticipated in the resistance struggle against the Japanese were murdered by the Com¬munists, or betrayed to the Kuomintang or Japanese. European Trotskyists who were transported to the concentration camps were subject to similar treatment by their fellow Stalinist prisoners, and one can only assume that Trotskyists who par¬ticipated in French resistance continually faced the risk of betrayal and assassina¬tion by the Stalinists. Hopefully, these brief points will serve to set the record straight and show that it was not the Trotskyists who were respon¬sible for retarding the advance of revolu¬tionary Socialism during the war, but rather the counter revolutionary Stalinists. Communist greetings Ian Driver |